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Perpetually ‘Partly Free’: Lessons from Post-Soviet Hybrid Regimes on
Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe
Eleanor Knott
Department of Methodology, London School of Economics
Abstract
This article discusses the lessons that can be drawn from post-Soviet experiences of democratisa-
tion in hybrid regimes for debates on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) ‘democratic backslid-
ing’. Focusing on Moldova and Ukraine, the article investigates the ebb and flow of post-Soviet
democratisation in hybrid regimes. It explores factors that have hindered democratisation,
namely state and media capture by business-political interests, and factors that have hindered
authoritarian consolidation, namely civil society and citizens’ potential for mobilisation. The
article reflects on how these factors can inform debates on backsliding in more consolidated
democracies, such as CEE states.
Keywords: Ukraine, Moldova, post-Soviet, democratic backsliding, democratisation, hybrid
regimes
“In an age of images and symbols, elections are easy to capture on film. (How do you
televise the rule of law?)”
— Zakaria (1997, 40)
Introduction
Whether in Russia, Turkey, or Hungary, there is a fear that democratisation has been waning
and democratic backsliding is “incipient” (Diamond 2015; Cooley 2015; Kapstein and Converse
2008). Backsliding, however, in terms of increasing repression and decreasing political compe-
tition (Dresden and Howard 2015), is not a uniform process that affects all states, or even all
democratic states, in similar ways. Instead, states experience backsliding at different speeds,
within different regime types, and reach different endpoints (Bermeo 2016).
This article addresses the lessons for understanding backsliding in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (hereafter CEE) that might be learned from observing backsliding in post-Soviet hybrid
regimes. These hybrid regimes have largely remained in the grey zone between consolidated
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democratic and authoritarian regimes for more than 25 years. These regimes have also oscil-
lated between periods of democratic progress and backsliding which I conceive as a democratic-
authoritarian dynamic equilibrium. This article addresses two questions: first, how and why
have these hybrid regimes remained in a democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium? Second,
what lessons can we learn for understanding CEE democratic backsliding from the democratic-
authoritarian dynamic equilibrium in hybrid regimes?
In this article, I focus on the cases of Moldova and Ukraine as two hybrid regimes which are
typical cases of the democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium. Hybrid regimes are useful
sites to consider processes of backsliding (Diamond 2002), by thinking comparatively about what
lessons from hybrid regimes can be learnt relevant to understand CEE backsliding. In part, this
is because CEE states may become—or in the case of Hungary have become—hybrid regimes
(Bozóki and Hegedűs 2018).1 Backsliding, then, may not result in a slide into consolidated
authoritarianism (Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg 2017). Rather, backsliding might, in
more subtle ways, keep states in a democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium that is hard
to overcome where democratization and backsliding rather ebb and flow in ways that maintain
hybrid regimes (see also Hale 2014).
The article proceeds as follows. First, I conceptualise backsliding and discuss backsliding in
relation to hybrid regimes. Second, I situate hybrid regimes—specifically Ukraine and Moldova—
within a broader post-communist context which includes CEE (semi-)consolidated democracies
and other post-Soviet (semi-)consolidated authoritarian regimes. Third, I address the specific
lessons for CEE that hybrid regime cases can provide in understanding democratic backsliding in
a democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium. On the one hand, I argue that corruption and
state capture, together with media capture, help to explain why efforts towards democratization
have seemed difficult to sustain and often appeared to implode on themselves. On the other hand,
I argue that civil society and citizens’ potential to mobilise has provided checks on authoritarian
consolidation.
Backsliding through the Lens of Hybrid Regimes
Political scientists have long accepted the need to think beyond democracy as a dichotomous
variable to consider the “grey zone” of regime types (Carothers 2002). Within this “grey zone”, I
focus on hybrid regimes, or as Levitsky and Way (2010a) term them, competitive authoritarian
1It is worth noting that whether Hungary is a hybrid regime is an area of contention. Bozóki and Hegedűs
(2018) consider Hungary to have backslided into a hybrid regime, whereas Freedom House’s 2018 report on
Nations in Transit still considers Hungary to be a semi-consolidated democracy.
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regimes. In hybrid regimes, like Ukraine and Moldova, democratic institutions are fragile and
challenges to political rights and civil liberties persist. There is competition in the form of regular
multi-party elections, but this competition is often not fair because it does not take place on a
“level playing field” (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 2010b). Many post-Soviet hybrid regimes, such
as Ukraine and Moldova, have experienced periods of democratic progress (while falling short
of becoming fully democratic) and periods of backsliding. Hybrid regimes can be distinguished
from semi-consolidated democracies like Romania and Bulgaria—as electoral democracies that
are only partially consolidated—and semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes like Armenia—
as non-electoral democracies, which are only partially consolidated as authoritarian (Freedom
House 2017a).2
Backsliding is different from critical junctures, such as coups or electoral fraud, which result
in more instantaneous authoritarianism (Bermeo 2016). Backsliding concerns a gradual process
of democratic erosion and weakening initiated by political elites, typically presidents (Kapstein
and Converse 2008, 57). In this article, I use the term backsliding, as opposed to democratic
backsliding. This is to emphasise how backsliding can, and does, occur not only within countries
that have become (semi-)consolidated democracies but more commonly within states, like hybrid
regimes, that have not become consolidated democracies (Dresden and Howard 2015).
Backsliding may take place through elections, in particular, the strategic manipulation of
elections, electoral rules and for example via media control, and practices which favour incum-
bents and harass opposition (Bermeo 2016).3 Backsliding may also concern forms of increasing
repression outside the electoral process (e.g., violating civil liberties) and/or decreasing com-
petition outside of electoral periods with the aim of ensuring and aggrandising incumbent’s
executive power (Dresden and Howard 2015; Levitsky and Way 2010a; Bermeo 2016). Pech and
Scheppele (2017) also discuss “rule of law backsliding” and judicial capture where public au-
thorities with large parliamentary majorities, at least in the cases of Poland and Hungary, seek
to change electoral rules to create clear majorities and, thus, maintain their hold over power.
Further, Greskovits (2015) distinguishes between backsliding and hollowing. Greskovits (2015)
conceives of hollowing as declining interest of citizens to participate in and identify with politics
to show that backsliding and hollowing are neither coterminous nor causally related. In other
2Of course, consolidated and semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes often still have regular elections, as a
source of legitimacy, but these elections are flawed (e.g., opposition are controlled, results fabricated) rather than
free or fair.
3This manipulation of elections is strategic because it is less likely to be exposed to international criticism
from election observers.
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words, backsliding may be accompanied by hollowing, but civic engagement in politics may also
continue even if formal politics is experiencing backsliding.
This article, however, makes an additional point: understandings of backsliding need to go
beyond focusing on the power and aggrandisement of incumbents and backsliding via formal
politics. Previously, scholars have emphasised structural factors which have facilitated and
limited strong incumbents, emphasising the plurality and weakness of central authorities in
hybrid regimes (Way 2002; Haran 2012; Way 2015).4 Understandings of both hybridity and
backsliding focus on incumbent officeholders in central authorities and their attempts to limit
competition and increase repression to increase the incumbent’s hold on power (Dresden and
Howard 2015; Levitsky and Way 2010a; Bermeo 2016). These incumbents use the state to create
or maintain resource disparities, and capturing institutions such as judiciary so that they do not
check, but rather cement, power (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 10).
However, there are factors beyond the concentration and aggrandisement of incumbent power,
which I term extra-incumbent factors, which have resulted in hybrid regimes remaining in a
democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium. Extra-incumbent factors are those which con-
cern the informal power held by those outside the presidency, and formal political office more
generally (such as cabinet posts). These extra-incumbent factors include grey cardinals who
pursue successful state capture. At least in Ukraine and Moldova, these grey cardinals hail from
business-political elites and engage in media capture as processes separate to, while enabling,
state capture.
These extra-incumbent factors are critical for understanding why hybrid regimes remain in
a democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium. In backsliding CEE states, the sequence of
extra-incumbent forces may differ (see also Hanley and Vachudova, this issue) and may intersect
with incumbent aggrandisement (e.g., in Hungary and Poland). But in CEE cases of backsliding,
we also see the growth of extra-incumbent forces pursuing state capture and media capture in
ways that make backsliding harder to overcome, in particular for states like Hungary which
increasingly resemble hybrid regimes.
The Ebb and Flow of the Democratic-Authoritarian Dynamic Equilibrium in
Moldova and Ukraine
Hybrid regimes in the post-Soviet context did not experience a rapid democratic transfor-
mation (Levitsky and Way 2010a). Rather, hybrid regimes have remained strikingly dynamic
4Scholars have also considered the diversity of hybrid regimes, in terms of ethnicity, language, and regional
diversity (D’Anieri 2011; Brudny and Finkel 2011).
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as hybrid regimes experiencing periods of democratisation and backsliding that maintain them
in this state of hybridity (Hale 2014). Two exemplary cases of the dynamism of post-Soviet
hybrid regimes are Moldova and Ukraine. The article focuses on these cases not for comparative
leverage (e.g., to consider differences between Ukraine and Moldova) but for the fact that both
demonstrate this hybridity and dynamism well, in particular since the 2000s.5
As Figure 1 demonstrates, both Ukraine and Moldova have ebbed and flowed in terms of
periods of democratic improvement and backsliding. Figure 1 also shows the extent to which
these periods have mirrored each other in Ukraine and Moldova, ebbing and flowing at different
periods in time. Here I use data from V-Dem because these measures can demonstrate this
nuance more effectively, by teasing out different measures of democracy, and is more receptive
to changes on the ground than Polity IV and Freedom House measures of democracy (Bernhard
2017).6 What Figure 1 shows is how measures of electoral democracy have been consistently
higher in Ukraine and Moldova than measures of political inclusion, deliberation, resource allo-
cation, and protection of rights.7 At the same time, it is worth noting that measures of electoral
democracy are higher than other measures of democracy across most states in the V-Dem in-
dices.8 This demonstrates the need to look beyond elections as sites where democracy might ebb
and flow given that electoral forms of democracy might paint a more positive picture than mea-
sures of democracy beyond elections. Following Figure 1, I now briefly examine how Moldova
and Ukraine have remained in this equilibrium (summarised in Table 1). I focus primarily on the
period from the early 2000s when the ebb and flow of democratisation and backsliding became
more apparent and after the stalling (and dynamic) democratisation of the mid-late 1990s.9
In Moldova, as we might expect in a hybrid regime (Levitsky and Way 2010a), elections
5Ukraine and Moldova also share many relevant similarities, such as Soviet experiences/legacies, being mem-
bers of European Union (EU) neighbourhood and ethnic/linguistic diversity, as well as differences, in terms of
demographic and territorial size and role of regions.
6Polyarchy is a measure of electoral democracy, liberal democracy is a measure of protection of individual
and minority rights, participatory democracy is a measure of the ability of citizens to participate in electoral and
non-electoral forms of politics, deliberative democracy is a measure of how far “public reasoning focused on the
common good motivates political decisions” and, finally, egalitarian democracy is a measure of how power and
material/ non-material resources are distributed. See Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell,
Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, et al. (2018) for the full explication of these indices and their sub-components.
7In Ukraine, electoral democracy is on average 0.163 points higher (SD = 0.035) than the average of the four
other measures; in Moldova electoral democracy is on average 0.184 higher (SD = 0.029) (1990-2017).
8In fact, the only countries in the V-Dem dataset where electoral democracy is not higher than the average
of the four other measures (1990-2017) are United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Bhutan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.
9 I use a variety of sources of quantitative data (e.g. V-Dem), journalistic/local evidence, and Nations in
Transit reports to substantiate the cases, and the lessons that can be drawn from these cases.
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Figure 1: Measures of Democracy for using V-Dem (2018) Indices (1991-2017)
This figure was assembled using V-Dem data on five democracy indices collected from Coppedge, Gerring, Knut-
sen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, et al. (2018).
have generally been free and transparent since independence (BTI 2016).10 At the same time,
10The point is that manipulation of elections does not occur at the point of the election (e.g., vote rigging) but
around and between election cycles, by maintaining an uneven playing field (see Levitsky and Way 2010b).
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Table 1: Summary of Democratic-Authoritarian Dynamic Equilibrium
Ukraine Moldova
Democratization 2004-2010 under Yushchenko 2010-2013: under pro-European
coalitions
2014-present: since Euromaidan un-
der Poroshenko (to some extent)
Backsliding 2010-2014: under Yanukovych 2008-2010: towards repressive final
year of Communist government
2015-present: under Plahotniuc-led
state capture
Moldova has experienced periods of increasing repression, and curtailment of political rights,
notably during the end of the administration of the Communist Party of Moldova (2008-2010)
which ruled as a successor, but democratically elected party, in Moldova (2001-2009). Moldova
has also experienced brief periods of transformation and reform, for example, reforms improving
the rule of law and anti-corruption, under the pro-European coalition (2010-2013).
Moldova’s party in government and its underpinning ideology changed in 2009, from Commu-
nist to pro-European. Similarly, the set of favoured oligarchs who made their wealth through pri-
vatisation changed, away from Vladimir Voronin, Moldova’s Communist president (2001-2009),
towards pro-European oligarchs (Hale 2013). The most notable oligarch has been Vladimir
Plahotniuc.11 Yet, redolent of Hellman’s (1998) “winner takes all” model, the pro-European
coalition failed to instigate or enact more dramatic and long-lasting changes that might sub-
stantially change Moldova’s political system because of the rents individuals and groups, such
as political parties, could gain from an unreformed system. For example in 2014, the largest
worldwide banking theft ever occurred in Moldova, with $1 billion lost in Moldova’s banking
system (Radu, Munteanu, and Ostanin 2015). The fact that such a large theft could occur and
the way it has been investigated are both evidence of the extent to which Moldovan politics has
become rotten from the inside despite the promise of reforms. Hence, Moldova remains a system
dominated by overlapping business-political interests, which have sought to capture the state
for profit.
Like Moldova, Ukraine remains in a democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium, experi-
11To some extent, it remains unclear how Plahotniuc made his fortune. Officially, Plahotniuc forged his
career exporting wine to Russia and through Moldovan-US investments. There are also accusations that human
trafficking and prostitution have provided important sources of revenue (Całus 2016).
7
encing periods of democratisation (under Viktor Yushchenko, 2004-2009) and backsliding (2009-
2014) with the “soft” authoritarian regime of Viktor Yanukovych (Haran 2011). Following the
2004 Orange Revolution, protests gained momentum against claims that Yanukovych had par-
ticipated in electoral fraud to secure his victory. Yushchenko was then elected President in
the re-run elections. As President, Yushchenko was both a “determined reformer” and a “failed
statesman” (Yekelchyk 2007, 207, 28), offering hope of reform which he could not deliver (like
the pro-European government in Moldova).12 For example, the Yushchenko administration did
not and could not introduce necessary reforms, such as a public television service, to build a
state more resilient to subsequent backsliding because of political rivals supported by oligarchs
and their clan networks, such as Yanukovych (Haran 2011). Perhaps, paradoxically, Hale (2014,
12-13) shows how this “democratic interlude” occurred because of this “pact” between those
holding formal power and those wielding informal power because neither could aggrandise their
power. At the same time, this limited the scope for democratic reforms that might overhaul these
systems of power. It also alienated voters from supporting Yushchenko or Yulia Tymoshenko
after 2010 (Kudelia 2014), but did not entirely undo the role of the Orange Revolution, showing
“Ukrainian citizens that their votes matter” and that protests could achieve results (Yekelchyk
2007, 228).
Ukraine experienced democratic backsliding, and “soft authoritarianism” under Yanukovych’s
presidency, culminating in the Euromaidan revolution in 2013-2014. Yanukovych won the pres-
idency in 2010 in what were considered to be “generally free and fair” presidential elections
(Freedom House 2011a). In office, the Yanukovych regime practised “public and formal” coer-
cion, including show trials, as well as constitutional vandalism, using the constitutional court
to revert to the 1996 constitution, introducing a mixed electoral system and strengthening the
presidency, after it was abolished following the 2004 Orange revolution (Kudelia 2014; Wilson
2014). Euromaidan, which began in late 2013 as a pro-European protest movement, switched
with increasing repression and violence to the “Revolution of Dignity”, as an anti-corruption and
anti-system protest. Yanukovych’s exit left Ukraine with a hole in its public finances, through
years of embezzlement of millions of dollars of state funds (Aslund 2014), and without central
authority, empowering Russia to seize Crimea and stoke violence in Donbas, a region once dom-
inated by Party of Regions. Since Euromaidan, Ukraine has become freer but reforms—which
might strengthen the degree of checks and balances—remain slow.
12It is for this reason that I conceive of Ukraine as reforming and democratising during Yushchenko’s presidency
but falling short of consolidating a democratic breakthrough.
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1. Post-Soviet Lessons of being Perpetually ‘Partly Free’
In the following sections, I examine in more detail the reasons behind the democratic-
authoritarian dynamic equilibrium that we can observe in Ukraine and Moldova, with an empha-
sis on extra-incumbent factors. The reasons presented are not exhaustive but draw attention to
what makes the democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium hard to overcome towards con-
solidated democracy and authoritarianism. Similar to Hellman (1998) and Hale (2014), I focus
on the system of politics that perpetuates enrichment-based politics in an uneven playing field
in ways that provide useful lessons for understanding CEE backsliding.
These factors steer beyond what might be considered “formal politics”, incumbents and the
role of political parties (except where political parties take on the role of clientelist clan networks)
to demonstrate the need to see hybrid regimes and CEE backsliding through the lens of “informal
politics”. It is in the scope of informal politics, and the encroachment of informal politics into
the space of formal politics, that we can start to examine how hybrid regimes function through
informality, such as patron-client relationships (see also Hale 2014).
These factors also steer away from emphasising the role of nationalism and ethnic politics.
A great deal has been written about the role of ethnic politics as a reason for weakness in hybrid
regimes, including in Ukraine and Moldova (Way 2015). However, ethnic politics can often
obscure the importance of informal politics which often does not map on to ethnic cleavages
neatly but is used by political forces in hybrid regimes to deflect from informal politics which,
in turn, can provide further disincentives for reform.
The first two sections deal with the factors that this article conceives have limited the po-
tential for democratisation (corruption and extra-incumbent state capture, and extra-incumbent
media capture) by perpetuating the unequal playing field. Meanwhile, the third section con-
siders the role of civil society and protest movements in limiting the potential for authoritarian
consolidation. While these three factors appear somewhat directional—preventing large-scale
democratisation or abating large-scale authoritarian consolidation—the point is that these fac-
tors contribute to maintaining the dynamic status quo where efforts to reform, for example in the
direction of democratization, can only go so far before they seemingly implode on themselves.
Lesson One: State Capture and Crony Capitalism
All post-Communist states, including (semi-)consolidated democratic CEE regimes, struggle
with corruption. However, corruption in hybrid regimes like Ukraine and Moldova is more rife
and systemic than in CEE countries. As Figure 2 illustrates, corruption in Ukraine and Moldova,
compared to Romania and Hungary, centres on the judiciary and enforcement institutions (po-
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lice), but also representative institutions (parties, legislature).13 What marks hybrid regimes
like Moldova and Ukraine out is the scope and scale of corruption which, redolent of Hellman’s
(1998) argument of a “winner takes all equilibrium” provides incentives for reproducing the hy-
brid system of self-enrichment, rather than reforming it, for example, by strengthening checks
and balances which might advance democratization.
Systemic corruption in Ukraine and Moldova, like in Russia, is a legacy of both Soviet state-
society relations, and a product of the scarcity, banditry and crony capitalism of the 1990s
(Ledeneva 2013; Darden 2001). In post-Soviet hybrid regimes, corruption is not, according to
the investigative journalist Oliver Bullough (2017), something that affects “an otherwise healthy
organism [. . . ] Corruption was the system, and it metastasised into any parts of the state
apparatus that remained healthy”. At the everyday level, as Figure 3 demonstrates, bribes
function as ways to get things done in Ukraine and Moldova, even more quickly or at all. By
contrast in Hungary and Romania, and especially in Hungary, bribes function as an expression
of gratitude. At the social level, systems of patronage and nepotism underpin the fabric of
society, forming networks of loyalty across friend-family ties. Social practices, such as weddings
and baptisms, formalise these into cumătrism/kumovstvo networks in Moldova and Russia with
godparents (cumătri/kuma) to the children or married couple a statement of these networks of
loyalty (Institute of World Policy 2012; Ledeneva 2013).14 This is not to suggest that all social
practices are necessarily nepotistic, and thus pathological. Rather, it indicates how systems of
loyalty across friend-family networks are a critical dimension of politics which is easily overlooked.
Moreover, they demonstrate the extent to which informal politics and networks of power pose
challenges for reforming formal politics because informal politics, through systems of nepotism,
incentivise a type of formal politics that maintains the status quo and does not encroach on
informal politics (Hellman 1998; Hale 2014).
This means that, at the formal level, the state in hybrid regimes is entrenched in corruption.
The system encourages elites to compete with each other for power over the system outside
13These weak judiciaries leave hybrid regimes exposed to international corruption schemes, such as the Russian
“laundromat” which used Moldovan courts to certify and launder Russian debt (Sanduta and Preasca 2016).
Moldova’s rule of law remains weak while there are few incentives to reform, because of the potential to profit
from this weakness.
14Cumătrism/Kumovstvo are frequently translated to mean cronyism or nepotism. However, this does not
fully capture the concept, where marrying couples choose "godparents", who integrate into the family in a formal
sense, as older individuals with whom couples build networks of influence and deference. More work in post-Soviet




Figure 2: Sites of Most Corruption
Source: Global Corruption Barometer (Transparency International 2013) NB: the cases used are determined by
the data available (e.g., there is no available data on Poland).
of elections, rather than compete in terms of policies (Christensen, Rakhimkulov, and Wise
2005). For Moldova and Ukraine, as hybrid regimes, this is an issue of status quo: elites since
independence have been more concerned with competing with each other over rents than over
policies. Regimes and even elites may change. However, the system of corruption, cronyism,
and nepotism is maintained because there is little political appetite, and few incentives, for
wider-reaching reforms that would provide checks on state capture and threaten the livelihoods
and power of those pursuing state capture (Freedom House 2017a). The incentives are to be part
of, to need and to profit from the system and, thus, to maintain the democratic-authoritarian
dynamic equilibrium.
Most pernicious in maintaining hybridity has been the rivalry between oligarchs over the
state and its resources. In Ukraine, under Leonid Kuchma, crony capitalism fuelled the growth
of rival and regional clans, which entered into a “cosy symbiosis” between government and oli-
garchs, centred around the regional-industrial centres of Donbas and Dnipropetrovsk (Yekelchyk
2007, 204-5). Under Yanukovych, the Donbas clan became the most influential, allowing the
Yanukovych “family” and its patrons, via the Party of Regions, to enrich themselves while coerc-
ing others (Kudelia 2014; Wilson 2014). Yanukovych’s victory allowed for the monopolization
of state control by a “party of power” (the Party of Regions), as a party-clan which dominated
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Figure 3: The most common reason for paying bribes
Source: Global Corruption Barometer (Transparency International 2013) NB: the cases used are determined by
the data available (e.g., there is no available data on Poland).
Ukraine’s presidency, legislature, and judiciary and had conquered many regions beyond the
industrial Donbas hub, for the first time in Ukraine’s history (Kudelia 2014; Freedom House
2011b). Moreover, the Party of Regions was merged with the “family”—Yanukovych, his direct
family, patrons and allies—and, in turn, with the state (Kudelia 2014).
State capture by Moldova’s key oligarch and grey cardinal, Plahotniuc, has become more
noticeable since 2013. Plahotniuc has been able to use the state to enrich himself, while engaging
in racketeering, to seize assets from competitors with impunity (BTI 2016; Chayes 2016).15 At
the same time, Plahotniuc has rarely held public office because he is in the strange position of
being unpopular in Moldova and, thus, unelectable by traditional routes. Instead, Plahotniuc
has acted either in the shadows, via proxy candidates, or informally to gain power within, and
over, the political system (Knott and Pops,oi 2016; Chayes 2016). Further evidence of this are the
recent changes to Moldova’s electoral system in significant ways in ways that benefit Plahotniuc
and signal rule of law capture. First, were changes to the presidency using the constitutional
15For example, in the case of the 2014 banking theft, those implicated have received unequal punishment
demonstrating how the judicial system is a weapon against rivals rather than a check on power. While Moldova’s
former Prime Minister, and Plahotniuc’s central business and political rival, Vlad Filat was sentenced to nine
years in prison for his involvement in the banking theft. Meanwhile, others, such as Ilan Shor, have received a
lesser penalty, including periods of house arrest (Knott and Pops,oi 2016).
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court to switch to directly elected presidents in 2016.16 Switching to a directly elected president
provided opportunities for Plahotniuc to have proxies elected president because both Plahotniuc
and the Democrat party were also so out of favour with Moldovan voters that Plahotniuc came to
implicitly endorse Igor Dodon (finance minister in the Communist government during the period
Plahotniuc made his fortune), through the Plahotniuc-owned media attack on Dodon’s pro-EU
reformist rival, Maia Sandu. Second, have been moves to switch Moldova from a proportional
to a mixed electoral system in 2017 in ways that might allow Plahotniuc’s Democrat Party to
increase their seats.17
Business-political clans, centred around figures like Plahotniuc and Yanukovych, use the
tools of the state, such as security services, as well as their private assets, such as hotels, to gain
compromising information (kompromat) to use as leverage over opponents through blackmail;
the state is then effectively a “blackmail state” (Darden 2001, 67). Business-political clans also
seek external legitimacy, to secure funding (e.g., from the IMF) and buttress internal legiti-
macy through international lobbying firms, or as Puddington (2017a) describes them “K Street
representatives”. 18 What is more shocking is that, for external western audiences, Dodon
is often portrayed as a pro-Russian proxy of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, including by
Plahotniuc in ways that play up a geopolitical rivalry between Dodon and a “pro-European”
and “pro-Western” Plahotniuc, and threat posed to Moldova by Russia (and by Dodon).19 In
reality, Dodon and Plahotniuc are more united by their shared goals of self-enrichment. Yet,
their performance of a geopolitical cleavage plays into the way that western audiences want to
see Moldova, as dominated by a west versus Russia cleavage. These tactics are designed to woo
governments in western democracies, notably the US, using the language of being supportive of
democratisation, reform and stability to please donors while deflecting international attention
and criticism away from state capture.20
16Plahotniuc is aware that he is too unpopular in Moldova to be President. The constitutional court was able
to change the electoral system by cancelling a 2000 constitutional amendment.
17The Venice Commission and OSCE (2017) jointly condemned the changes to the electoral system because
electoral system changes should be a broader public debate than within parliamentary political parties (e.g.,
include civil society, public consultation) and because it was condemned by some political parties. The joint
report also argued that “the proposed reform could potentially have a negative effect at the constituency level,
where independent majoritarian candidates may develop links with or be influenced by businesspeople or other
actors who follow their own separate interests”.
18In reference to the street in Washington DC where the firms are gathered. Puddington (2017a) notes China as
the “vanguard” in this, with examples also from Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Ethiopia and “practically
all of the authoritarian states in the Middle East”.
19See, for example, op-eds by Plahotniuc (2017, 2016) in Politico and The Hill.
20For example, the US firm Podesta has been hired both by Plahotniuc/Democratic Party and by the European
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In all, the systemic nature of corruption creates incentives for self-enrichment and policies to
maintain the regime, rather than to pursue reforms which are fundamental to democratisation,
such as the rule of law. The costs of exit, to individuals, their families and patrons, are high
(Kuzio 2005). For example, when Yanukovych left office, he and most of his family and allies left
to Russia, to retain as many of their assets as possible and avoid punishment for embezzlement.21
Moreover, the systemic nature of corruption makes individuals dependent on the system, liable to
be leveraged via compromising information, and thus resistant to reform (Darden 2001; Ledeneva
2013).
To some extent, there are positive and negative implications of this lesson for CEE backslid-
ing. First, CEE cases do not have the same systemic, and malignant, networks of patronage.
Even Romania, which is culturally similar to Moldova, does not have systems of cumătrism as
Moldova does, even if Romania is still a system exposed to nepotism and cronyism. The sys-
temic nature of these networks are the fabric of society where these networks, so far, have remain
untouched by any reforms in Moldova. This means that even if Hungary functions as a “party
state” using Fidesz to distribute resources, such as EU transfers, through “clientele systems of
friendly oligarchs” (Agh 2016), party does not extend into the same degree of pre-existing net-
works of patronage that bind together regimes like Moldova. Here, the issue of sequencing is
also important. In Hungary, clientelism is an outcome of backsliding rather than a factor that
inhibits democratization, as it is in hybrid regimes.
Second, the systemic nature of corruption in hybrid regimes and the importance of informal
power, where grey cardinals pursue state capture, focuses our attention beyond formal politics.
In hybrid regimes, there has been more discussion of the role informal politics plays in maintain-
ing these systems as hybrid. In CEE states, thus, we need to focus more on the role of informal
power. In Romania and Poland, we see the role of grey cardinals who have power within parties,
such as Liviu Dragnea within Romania’s Social Democrat Party (PSD) and Jaroslaw Kaczyński
within Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS), often as the presidents of these parties. At the
same time, neither Dragnea nor Kaczyński hold much formal power within the system (i.e.,
they are not incumbents), but instead hold a great deal of informal power over the system. For
example, Dragnea has been instrumental in having his preferred candidates become Romania’s
prime minister. Romania’s most recent prime minister, Viorica Dăncilă, is the third example
Centre for a Modern Ukraine, an organisation with ties to Party of Regions, to create a positive image in the US
of these individuals and organisations (Knott and Pops,oi 2016; Leshchenko 2014b).
21Yanukovych is wanted by Interpol. However, Russia refuses to extradite him or to seize his assets (Trans-
parency International 2015).
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of Dragnea being able to install his preferred candidate. In part, this arises because Dragnea
cannot hold the office of prime minister himself due to previous corruption convictions though
can work in wielding informal power to try to lessen anti-corruption laws (Freedom House 2018).
Thus, like Plahotniuc in Moldova, we need to focus beyond the power of incumbents to examine
the crucial ways in which capture of the state and rule of law can be pursued by those outside
of formal power.
Finally, we can learn from hybrid regimes in taking a more honest appraisal of why grey
cardinals, as well as incumbents, pursue state capture. For example, in the case of Hungary it
is often framed as if self-enrichment and state capture are goals purely for the pursuit of power
(Agh 2016), as opposed to self-enrichment for the sake of it. From hybrid regimes we can learn
that, perhaps, this distinction is less useful if the result if the same. Business-political elites
wielding formal and/or informal power pursue state capture to protect themselves for as long as
they can in a system where the incentives for reform are reduced while the costs of exit rise.
Lesson Two: The Dark Side of Media Ownership
The media is an additional layer demonstrating the business-political “cosy symbiosis” in
hybrid regimes and CEE (semi-)consolidated democracies. The importance of an open indepen-
dent media, whether public or private though free from the gaze of the state, does not need to
be underlined as an ideal of a consolidated democracy (Dahl 1973). Media allows citizens to
be informed and make informed political choices. Media “muckrakers” are a crucial check on
governments with the potential to expose corruption and cronyism (Institute of World Policy
2012). Business-political interests are savvy to the role of “muckrakers” in democratisation and
have an incentive to control media through ownership and repression.
In cases of CEE backsliding, such as Poland, Hungary, and Romania, we see the media
continually under attack, and increasingly in the hands of those seeking to consolidate power and
pursue backsliding. We see this more severely, in hybrid regimes, whether in terms of attempts
to reduce media freedoms or to control the media market through ownership, to control the
information circulating about those in formal and informal positions of power. Thus, media,
and in particular ownership and capture of media, plays a crucial role in supporting the corrupt
system of personal oligarchic enrichment and, in turn, the democratic-authoritarian dynamic
equilibrium found in hybrid regimes. This seemingly obvious point is often overlooked. But
media capture is a significant process separate to, but often occurring alongside (and often by
the same group of political-business actors), state capture helping to underscore the accumulation
of informal power of grey cardinals and formal power of incumbents.
What is especially problematic about the media in hybrid regimes has been the murky and
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uncertain terrain surrounding ownership which is controlled not by the state but those wielding
informal power. In Moldova, it was unclear for many years who owned many of the media
outlets. Following pressure from civil society, media outlets revealed what many had suspected:
high level of ownership concentration in the hands of one individual—Plahotniuc—who controls
about 60-70% of the broadcast market (Gogu 2016; Independent Journalism Center 2015). 22
In Ukraine, media ownership is similarly concentrated in the hands of the overlapping business-
political elites. At the same time, it is more pluralistic than in Moldova because of the rival
oligarchs involved, given the oligarchic-regional competition existing in Ukraine.23 Again, the
disclosure of media ownership is a recent phenomenon, as a result of lobbying by civil society,
which has not resulted in reform, or the selling of media by oligarchs, but has confirmed what
was suspected about media ownership. Unlike in Moldova, media interests in Ukraine are not
deterred from criticising the government, but this still results in a highly politicised media
landscape. For example, Yanukovych’s remaining allies use their ownership of the media to
criticise the government and Petro Poroshenko (Freedom House 2017b).24
The point is not the capture of the media by formal politics or incumbents but the capture
of the media by business-political elites who capture the media to cement their informal power
and encroach into formal politics via the politicisation of media reporting in favour of the owners
and their interests (OSCE 2015). This media landscape mirrors the “Berlusconization” of media
ownership in CEE states which, in turn, has facilitated the politicisation of the media and
perpetuated state capture (Wyka 2007; Shekhovtsov 2016). Beyond free and fair elections, what
22TV is the primary form of media in Moldova. Plahotniuc owns four out the five major TV stations (Prime
TV, Publika TV, Canal 2, and Canal 3). The fifth channel is public (Moldova 1 ). Plahotniuc also owns three
major radio stations (Publika FM, Muz FM and Maestro FM ).
23Aside from Yanukovych’s allies, oligarchs owning media include: Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine’s current presi-
dent, who owns Channel 5; Ihor Kolomoysky, former Dnipropetrovsk governor, who owns 1+1 media group; and
Viktor Pinchuk, a businessman and husband of Kuchma’s daughter, who owns the media conglomerate StarLight-
Media, which comprises four channels. Even more pro-EU media is reportedly owned by the business/political
class, including President Poroshenko who retained ownership of Channel 5 despite becoming President (Freedom
House 2016). Rival oligarchs to Poroshenko, some of Ukraine’s wealthiest, also have media holdings, including
Viktor Pinchuk (Star Light Media), former Dnipropetrovsk governor Ihor Kolomoysky (1+1 Media Group) and
Rinat Akhmetov (Media Group Ukraine).
24For example, Serhiy Lyovochkin and Dimitri Firtash (Opposition Bloc) own TV Inter, Evghen Murayev (pro-
Russian “For Life” party) owns NewsOne, while Channel 112 and Channel 17 are owned by offshore companies
allied to Yanukovych (Freedom House 2017b). At the same time, state-owned media is not entirely subservient
to incumbents. For example, the state-owned First TV channel has been open in its criticism of government
figures, including the involvement of politicians such as Poroshenko in the Panama Papers scandal (Freedom
House 2017b).
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is critical is the nature of reporting during, and around, campaign periods (Levitsky and Way
2010a; Dresden and Howard 2015). Plahotniuc’s dominance of the media landscape allows his
outlets to be biased, reporting more often and more in favour of Moldova’s Democratic Party
and against Plahotniuc’s rivals (both pro-European and anti-European).25 While Moldova has
regulatory bodies, such as the Audio-visual Co-ordination Council (CCA), designed to ensure
elections are reported impartially. These bodies are weak, and lack a definition of impartiality,
allowing it to act with discretion, or more often not to act (OSCE 2017). The politicisation
of the media can also extend beyond the sphere of media ownership into society. While media
freedom has improved somewhat in the post-Euromaidan and post-Yanukovych era, journalists
continue to face violence, 26 including from civil society groups, and towards media, that is seen
as more pro-Russian.27
On the other hand, it is worth mentioning the role of grassroots and new media in Ukraine
and Moldova. Since the end of the Communist government in Moldova in 2009 and the Eu-
romaidan protests in Ukraine in 2013, there has been a plurality of written and visual media,
primarily online, that is more critical of politics and more pro-EU. In Moldova, such outlets
did not, and could not, exist during the Communist government (Freedom House 2010). While
much of the post-2009 market in Moldova is owned by business-political interests, there are also
examples of media outlets that overlap with civil society, such as rise.md, which have been a
critical part of investigative efforts (for example on the 2014 banking theft). In Ukraine, online
TV stations such as Hromadske (Civic), which was established following the beginning of Eu-
romaidan, demonstrates how the internet might change, or at least counter, traditional media
ownership. These outlets offer ways for those seeking to challenge business-political interests.
For example, in Moldova despite harassment from Plahotniuc-owned media Sandu adopted a
counter-media strategy in the 2016 presidential campaign by avoiding mainstream TV and me-
dia. The challenge is the proliferation of the media sources and messages beyond urban centres
and capital cities, for example where internet access can be sparser, given that business-political
interests have sought to capture the sources of media, such as TV, most prevalent in rural areas
(at least in Moldova).
25For example, Dodon’s formal (and Plahotniuc’s informal) rival in the 2016 race for the presidency, Maia
Sandu, was treated especially harshly by Plahotniuc-owned media outlets.
26For example, the Ukrainian Institute of Mass Media recorded 113 physical attacks against journalists in
Ukraine in the first part of 2016 alone (Human Rights Watch 2017). In July 2016, Pavlo Sheremet, a prominent
Ukrainskaya Pravda journalist, was murdered by a car bomb in the centre of Kyiv.
27For example, Inter (owned by Yanukovych’s former chief of staff, Lyovochkin) was attacked, and equipment
was broken, likely by Far Right Ukrainian nationalists (Freedom House 2017b).
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Media capture is, thus, fundamental to explaining why Ukraine and Moldova have remained
in a democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium. It is emblematic of the capture of business-
political elites into terrain beyond the state in efforts to sure up their take-over of the state.
Puddington (2017b) argues that the momentum of media crackdowns has been “led by Russia
and China”. However, this obscures the momentum that has taken hold within hybrid regimes to
keep them within this dynamic equilibrium as informal power holders, as business-political elites
have increased their power via the media. It is also important to recognise, at least in Moldova
and Ukraine, how attempts to curb media freedom, in particular since Russia’s incursion in
Ukraine, have occurred in the name of cracking down on media propaganda that these states
see as emanating from Russia.
We see the process of media capture by business-political elites too in CEE states, where
information is captured by business-political interests or dominant ruling parties to curtail media
freedom. Indeed, the worst performing CEE democracies, such as Bulgaria, are worse in terms
of press freedom than Ukraine or Moldova (Reporters without Borders 2017). As Hanley and
Vachudova note (in this issue), the sequencing of media capture and electoral victories varies
between CEE cases. However, the point is the same that media is a key terrain to be captured,
as a source of profit for business-political elites and a process which aids power accumulation by
restricting messages which work against, or seek to investigate, the business-politics symbiosis.
We see also, in the case of Romania, the embroilment of business-political elite media owners
in corruption scandals while, at the same time, journalists within these media organisations are
subservient to the interests of these owners (Freedom House 2018).
The point is not only the sequence of this media capture within the formal assemblage of
power. Rather, it is also the intractability this creates, as well as the furthering of cleavages
between urban centres/capital cities—which might have more access to diverse and more critical
media sources—and rural areas which are more likely to have restricted access to diverse and
freer media sources. This means even if newer media, from civil society or via social media, can
take hold it will find it hard to overcome these rural-urban dichotomies that are emblematic of
hybrid regimes and cases of backsliding in CEE states.
Lesson Three: The Hope of Civil Society and Political Engagement
Civil society is often conceived as the keystone between citizens and the state, allowing
individuals to engage in debate, organise collective action and affect policy. In turn, civil society
encourages political participation and political skills beyond political parties and, thus, promotes
democratisation by acting as a check on elites by making them more accountable (Diamond
1994).
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Soviet societies mobilised at the end of the Soviet period for national independence and
democracy (Beissinger 2002). However, post-Soviet societies in hybrid regimes are conceived as
inert and unwilling to become involved in collective action (Onuch 2015; Darden 2001). This is
explained by Soviet legacies, where individuals were subservient to the state. This subservience
fostered a political culture of civic passivity, and the disenchantment and disillusionment follow-
ing independence, where national-democratic movements failed to radically transform states and
societies, and the state-society relationship (Howard 2002). In all, the fall-away of the pater-
nalist state may have encouraged individuals to fall back more on friend-family networks. This
may explain the continued weakness of civil society where individuals choose to invest trust and
loyalty in internal friend-family networks rather than external issue-based networks (Kostovicova
2006; Smolar 1996).
Civil society in Ukraine and Moldova does not mobilise individuals to participate in collective
action. In the Euromaidan protests, scholars have found that civil society networks were a “weak
dispatcher” for the protest movement (Way 2014). Rather, individuals mobilise spontaneously
and via friend-family networks. These individual networks have also proved more significant than
social media, which disseminated information which mobilised neither protesters in Euromaidan
(Onuch 2015), nor in Moldova’s 2009 “Twitter revolution that wasn’t” (Hale 2013). Protests
might also not lead to the generation of new civil society organisations (CSOs), or organisations
that can penetrate more deeply into society. For example, organisations present in the Orange
Revolution did not become more significant in Euromaidan. Similarly, Lutsevych (2013) argues
that following Moldova’s 2009 so-called Twitter revolution, no new protest movements or CSOs
emerged.
Further, not all civil society in Ukraine and Moldova, present in CEE also, is liberal or civil in
terms of its values. In other words, some dimensions of civil society may promote values that are
precisely illiberal and intolerant, and sometimes violent. This counters assumptions that civil
society is necessarily benevolent and implicitly pro-democratic, promoting values of tolerance
and liberalism because, as in the case of Jobbik in Hungary, it promotes precisely the reverse
(Kopecký 2003). The involvement of the some of the most extremist parts of Ukraine’s uncivil
society, such as Azov Battalion in the fight against Russian and separatist forces in Donbas,
has only served to embolden and normalise the position of these groups in Ukrainian society
(Freedom House 2017b; Zhurzhenko 2015).
Yet, a good deal of power lies outside of how civil society is typically conceived, in terms of
formalised institutions, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), engaging with inter-
national organisations and networks. Ukraine and Moldova demonstrate how ordinary citizens
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can be a check on governments and help to counter political-business groups when they take
to the street to protest against systemic corruption. For example, while Euromaidan began as
a movement protesting for closer relations between Ukraine and the EU, it transformed into
a movement against the corruption, and after January 2014, the violence of the Yanukovych
regime. These protest movements are significant, in bringing civil society actors into the politi-
cal sphere, and potentially in abating democratic backsliding. This power is not transformative,
to the extent of being able to democratise hybrid regimes. But these movements can pull them
back from further backsliding within the democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium.
Civil society and ordinary citizens, therefore, remain a powerful force in hybrid regimes,
demonstrating large numbers of people can mobilise for issues they care about, such as state
capture and corruption, and limit authoritarian consolidation. In CEE states, also, we see the
potential of ordinary citizens mobilising, against threats to Polish public media and abortion
rights, in Hungary against threats to Central European University (CEU), where 80,000 have
taken to the streets in April 2017. From the beginning of 2017, Romania has witnessed the
largest protests since the end of Communism with up to 600,000 mobilising to oppose proposed
changes to the Criminal Code, including the pardoning of offences including abuse of office
(Freedom House 2018). Thus, backsliding does not mean ordinary citizens retreat into inertia.
Rather, ordinary citizens have issues to protect, in particular opposing state capture and systemic
corruption, by taking to the streets and are a fundamental part of the story of the democratic-
authoritarian dynamic equilibrium by preventing the slide into authoritarianism. Protests are
rarely sufficient in themselves in forcing change towards democratization either at the formal
and informal levels, by requiring governments to enact reforms that might reverse rule of law
capture. Yet, they do show incumbents and informal power holders that citizens matter in
hybrid and backsliding regimes.
Conclusion
This article conceived of backsliding as a process of limiting competition and/or increasing
repression. It has flagged three key arguments. First, in the context of post-Soviet hybrid
regimes, it argues, we need to consider not only how backsliding can lead to a wholesale change
of regime, where hybrid regimes backslide into consolidated forms of authoritarianism. We
also need to consider how hybrid regimes have experienced both periods of democratisation
and backsliding in which there are barriers which make consolidation of either democracy or
autocracy difficult.
Second, while scholars have previously focused on the power of incumbents, this article
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discussed how those who hold informal power beyond the executive limit the consolidation
of democracy through systemic corruption and nepotism. In turn, this limits incentives to
strengthen the rule of law, because of the potential rents gained from the weak rule of law which
limit the potential for democratisation out of the dynamic equilibrium. Media ownership and
freedom are a further dimension in which political-business interests intersect to keep hybrid
regimes in a democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium by limiting the possibility to enact
democratising reforms.
Third, a check is provided by civil society and grassroots mobilisation which has limited au-
thoritarian consolidation, and thus also helped to maintain hybrid regimes within the dynamic
democratic-authoritarian equilibrium. However, in the context of hybrid regimes, some quali-
fication is needed. Civil society in post-Communist and post-Soviet states has been typically
conceived as weak, but hybrid regimes have seen people mobilise on the streets at vital moments
and caused governments to change policies, if not to leave office. While state and media capture
are significant hurdles in hybrid regimes which maintain states in democratic-authoritarian dy-
namic equilibria, citizens are armed with new tools of mobilisation and information, via social
media, which will be significant in opposing oligarchs and state capture.
Considering lessons for other post-communist regions, hybrid regimes are different from con-
solidated and semi-consolidated democratic regimes and experience democratic backsliding in
different ways. CEE states are, comparatively, less subject to systemic corruption and cronyism
than hybrid regimes and have stronger institutions, but hybrid regimes provide a bad omen sce-
nario for CEE, concerning the incentives political-business clans, even in the absence of strong
ruling parties, have for pursuing backsliding for state capture and self-enrichment. On the other
hand, these lessons suggest that CEE states may not continue to backslide straight into author-
itarianism but rather, potentially, towards the democratic-authoritarian dynamic equilibrium
typical of hybrid regimes. As Hale (2014) argues, hybrid regimes are not a stage in between
authoritarianism and democracy but a type of regime in their own right which, by their dynamic
equilibrium nature, can become intractable. Following Hellman (1998), hybrid regimes resemble
systems of loyalty, and a symbiosis between business and political elites within formal politics
but also, crucially, within the domain of informal politics. It is these systems of loyalty difficult
to reform because the dynamic equilibrium serves the interests of those with power within the
system and, eventually, those seeking to challenge the system. In other words, CEE states that
backslide into hybrid regimes might be unlikely to slide into authoritarianism. However, they
might find themselves within such a dynamic democratic-authoritarian equilibrium that can
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